Axis of Oil: Shoot First and Inspect for Weapons Later.
An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq and WMD as Adopted on November 8, 2002

"According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'if Iraq violates this resolution and fails to comply, then the Council has to take into immediate consideration what should be done about that, while the United States and other like-minded nations might take a judgment about what we might do about it if the Council chooses not to act.' In other words, if the Council decision does not match what the Bush administration has unilaterally decided, Washington will implement its own decision regardless."

"Have we really bought the fiction, the Washington propaganda, that Iraq is a threat? We all know -- the issue is oil, oil and more oil. And U.S. control thereof. The new resolution of the UN Security Council is a charade, a device to obscure. Nevertheless it is transparent enough that one can point out the trip wires, hoops and hurdles (combined with dangerous ambiguity) placed so that Iraq must inevitably fail to avoid material breach. Then the Bush war can begin nicely covered in UN respectability -- although of course it has already begun, what with the 12 years of deadly embargo, the no-fly zone bombings and now placement of army, navy and air force resources on the ground in the Gulf, Kuwait, etc The resolution is little more than a sop to other member states and a response to the domestic pressures that took Bush to the General Assembly in September when he outrageously threatened the entire membership. Pressure on Baghdad to comply will not prevent war -- only intense pressure on the Bush regime might. To pretend this resolution represents progress, or is hopeful, or a move in the right direction strikes me as naive and dangerous."

"This resolution takes a hard-line approach that will almost certainly lead to war. Thirteen members of the Security Council were opposed to this resolution or deeply skeptical, but Washington used intense pressure and eventually bent them to its will. The U.S. used hardball diplomacy of the type deployed to gain the first Gulf War resolution in 1990. The Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, later described in his autobiography how he lined up votes for resolution 678: 'I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.'"

"In 1990, France, the Soviet Union and China all sold Iraq out at the Security Council…. Russia can be bought by getting admitted to the WTO and being given a free hand on Georgia and Chechnya, as well as having its oil interests guaranteed in Iraq. China wants an end to proposed high-tech U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. France wants its oil interests in Iraq protected, as well as its sphere of influence in Francophone Africa respected. The serious bargaining has yet to begin. The bottom line here is that the Bush Jr. administration originally sought and has now failed to obtain the same language from the UN Security Council that the Bush Sr. administration obtained in resolution 679 (1990), authorizing UN Member States 'to use all necessary means' to expel Iraq from Kuwait. So a unilateral attack by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq without further authorization from the Security Council would still remain illegal and therefore constitute aggression. In recognition of this fact, British government officials are already reportedly fearful of prosecution by the International Criminal Court. And the Bush Jr. administration is doing everything humanly possible to sabotage the ICC in order to avoid any prospect of ICC prosecution of high-level U.S. government officials over a war against Iraq. Lawyers call this 'consciousness of guilt.'"

"This will be used by the United States as an authorization by it, acting alone and without further UN approval, to go to war with Iraq. It will not, according to the U.S., require another resolution by the UN to go to war."

"Articles 1 and 2 contain language more or less certain to guarantee a new war if anything goes wrong with the UNMOVIC mission. Language finding Iraq already in 'material breach' and being given 'a final opportunity' to come clean is a rather ominous way of predetermining the outcome, especially when linked with articles 3 and 4 demanding a full and complete accounting and forbidding any misstatement. This opens the possibility that any missing document page or any evasive statement by any official could trigger a war."

"Because the U.S. has gotten so much Security Council opposition, an initial draft that was tailored to be a Rambouillet-style demand for effectively unlimited military occupation, which neither Iraq nor any other sovereign nation could accept, has been dramatically watered down. The provision for ground and air 'exclusion zones' was one of the key elements of that approach, and it has been retained. If UNMOVIC construes this power broadly enough, it will be an intolerable imposition of the kind that Iraq could not accept. Since Hans Blix has been cooperating closely with the United States, even allowing the U.S. to keep him from sending inspectors back to Iraq, it's not clear the UNMOVIC will be any more independent of U.S. policy considerations than UNSCOM was."

"One of the problems with UNSCOM is that it committed espionage, often involving leaving monitoring equipment behind in places that had been inspected. This provision seems like a way to make sure that UNMOVIC inspectors could also smuggle such equipment into inspected sites."

"This language is aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called 'no-fly' zones. Neither creation or military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned 'no-fly' zones. This section would serve to legitimize the 11-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of 'no-fly' zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to 'enforce' UN resolutions -- specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead."

"Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay, it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language."

"It could be argued that this is the second-stage meeting France and Russia desired and that the consequences of a breach are to be decided by the Security Council. But, by this time, such a meeting may not have any efficacy in stopping the U.S. from making unilateral war. Suppose the Council decides it does not think force is appropriate or reaches no decision -- deciding, for example, that Iraq has sufficiently complied. The U.S. might still go to war. It will argue that the Council has already decided that Iraq was in material breach of past resolutions and that any infraction of the current resolution was a 'material breach.' "

"Article 12 is actually the war empowerment part of the resolution. It does say that the Council will convene. In the absence of 'full compliance,' the wording directly [in the next paragraph] mentions 'serious consequences.' If such a meeting is held, the Security Council will in effect have a gun to its head, since the U.S. administration has already stated that if the UN fails to act, the U.S. will act unilaterally."

"This clear language should prohibit any country -- including the United States -- from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. However, given Bush administration officials' consistent claim that they need 'no further' UN resolutions to authorize the use of force 'to enforce' UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language. The inclusion of the reference 'in order to restore international peace and security' is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new 'consideration of the situation.' It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The fact that they specifically do not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council, and do not call for a new resolution or new decision, but only the informal call 'to convene' implies a lack of seriousness about the right of the Council alone to determine sufficiency of compliance and possible consequences."

Axis of Oil: Shoot First and Inspect for Weapons Later.
An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq and WMD as Adopted on November 8, 2002

"According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'if Iraq violates this resolution and fails to comply, then the Council has to take into immediate consideration what should be done about that, while the United States and other like-minded nations might take a judgment about what we might do about it if the Council chooses not to act.' In other words, if the Council decision does not match what the Bush administration has unilaterally decided, Washington will implement its own decision regardless."

"Have we really bought the fiction, the Washington propaganda, that Iraq is a threat? We all know -- the issue is oil, oil and more oil. And U.S. control thereof. The new resolution of the UN Security Council is a charade, a device to obscure. Nevertheless it is transparent enough that one can point out the trip wires, hoops and hurdles (combined with dangerous ambiguity) placed so that Iraq must inevitably fail to avoid material breach. Then the Bush war can begin nicely covered in UN respectability -- although of course it has already begun, what with the 12 years of deadly embargo, the no-fly zone bombings and now placement of army, navy and air force resources on the ground in the Gulf, Kuwait, etc The resolution is little more than a sop to other member states and a response to the domestic pressures that took Bush to the General Assembly in September when he outrageously threatened the entire membership. Pressure on Baghdad to comply will not prevent war -- only intense pressure on the Bush regime might. To pretend this resolution represents progress, or is hopeful, or a move in the right direction strikes me as naive and dangerous."

"This resolution takes a hard-line approach that will almost certainly lead to war. Thirteen members of the Security Council were opposed to this resolution or deeply skeptical, but Washington used intense pressure and eventually bent them to its will. The U.S. used hardball diplomacy of the type deployed to gain the first Gulf War resolution in 1990. The Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, later described in his autobiography how he lined up votes for resolution 678: 'I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.'"

"In 1990, France, the Soviet Union and China all sold Iraq out at the Security Council…. Russia can be bought by getting admitted to the WTO and being given a free hand on Georgia and Chechnya, as well as having its oil interests guaranteed in Iraq. China wants an end to proposed high-tech U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. France wants its oil interests in Iraq protected, as well as its sphere of influence in Francophone Africa respected. The serious bargaining has yet to begin. The bottom line here is that the Bush Jr. administration originally sought and has now failed to obtain the same language from the UN Security Council that the Bush Sr. administration obtained in resolution 679 (1990), authorizing UN Member States 'to use all necessary means' to expel Iraq from Kuwait. So a unilateral attack by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq without further authorization from the Security Council would still remain illegal and therefore constitute aggression. In recognition of this fact, British government officials are already reportedly fearful of prosecution by the International Criminal Court. And the Bush Jr. administration is doing everything humanly possible to sabotage the ICC in order to avoid any prospect of ICC prosecution of high-level U.S. government officials over a war against Iraq. Lawyers call this 'consciousness of guilt.'"

"This will be used by the United States as an authorization by it, acting alone and without further UN approval, to go to war with Iraq. It will not, according to the U.S., require another resolution by the UN to go to war."

"Articles 1 and 2 contain language more or less certain to guarantee a new war if anything goes wrong with the UNMOVIC mission. Language finding Iraq already in 'material breach' and being given 'a final opportunity' to come clean is a rather ominous way of predetermining the outcome, especially when linked with articles 3 and 4 demanding a full and complete accounting and forbidding any misstatement. This opens the possibility that any missing document page or any evasive statement by any official could trigger a war."

"Because the U.S. has gotten so much Security Council opposition, an initial draft that was tailored to be a Rambouillet-style demand for effectively unlimited military occupation, which neither Iraq nor any other sovereign nation could accept, has been dramatically watered down. The provision for ground and air 'exclusion zones' was one of the key elements of that approach, and it has been retained. If UNMOVIC construes this power broadly enough, it will be an intolerable imposition of the kind that Iraq could not accept. Since Hans Blix has been cooperating closely with the United States, even allowing the U.S. to keep him from sending inspectors back to Iraq, it's not clear the UNMOVIC will be any more independent of U.S. policy considerations than UNSCOM was."

"One of the problems with UNSCOM is that it committed espionage, often involving leaving monitoring equipment behind in places that had been inspected. This provision seems like a way to make sure that UNMOVIC inspectors could also smuggle such equipment into inspected sites."

"This language is aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called 'no-fly' zones. Neither creation or military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned 'no-fly' zones. This section would serve to legitimize the 11-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of 'no-fly' zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to 'enforce' UN resolutions -- specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead."

"Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay, it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language."

"It could be argued that this is the second-stage meeting France and Russia desired and that the consequences of a breach are to be decided by the Security Council. But, by this time, such a meeting may not have any efficacy in stopping the U.S. from making unilateral war. Suppose the Council decides it does not think force is appropriate or reaches no decision -- deciding, for example, that Iraq has sufficiently complied. The U.S. might still go to war. It will argue that the Council has already decided that Iraq was in material breach of past resolutions and that any infraction of the current resolution was a 'material breach.' "

"Article 12 is actually the war empowerment part of the resolution. It does say that the Council will convene. In the absence of 'full compliance,' the wording directly [in the next paragraph] mentions 'serious consequences.' If such a meeting is held, the Security Council will in effect have a gun to its head, since the U.S. administration has already stated that if the UN fails to act, the U.S. will act unilaterally."

"This clear language should prohibit any country -- including the United States -- from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. However, given Bush administration officials' consistent claim that they need 'no further' UN resolutions to authorize the use of force 'to enforce' UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language. The inclusion of the reference 'in order to restore international peace and security' is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new 'consideration of the situation.' It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The fact that they specifically do not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council, and do not call for a new resolution or new decision, but only the informal call 'to convene' implies a lack of seriousness about the right of the Council alone to determine sufficiency of compliance and possible consequences."