Henry George Has Been Proven Right

John Lanchester has a useful article in plain English in the LRB on the 'global financial crisis'.

At one point he makes a statement that nearly everyone recognises is correct but the full significance of which I dont think has been understood:

What links all these companies – and all the other companies and institutions around the world which have been felled by the credit crunch, from the Icelandic banks Glitnir and Landsbanki, the Belgian bank Fortis, the Irish bank Anglo Irish, Northern Rock which started it all, and all the other institutions that are currently in trouble – is that gigantic holes have appeared on the left-hand side of their balance sheets, where assets are listed. Those assets are for the most part linked in one way or another to the collapse in property prices in the US and elsewhere.

In other words, land speculation (the land boom and bust) is the cause of financial panics and crises and the subsequent general economic depression, as George argued more than 100 years ago.

Lanchester point out that banks by their nature have very large balance sheets and small equity compared to other businesses. (Is this the same as saying they are highly leveraged institutions?) It does not take much for them to become insolvent. But land busts typically see land values crash by 20, 30, 40 percent or more. In other words under a system of private property in land where money is loaned with land value as collateral the banking system is a disaster waiting to happen.

John Lanchester has a useful article in plain English in the LRB on the 'global financial crisis'.

At one point he makes a statement that nearly everyone recognises is correct but the full significance of which I dont think has been understood:

What links all these companies – and all the other companies and institutions around the world which have been felled by the credit crunch, from the Icelandic banks Glitnir and Landsbanki, the Belgian bank Fortis, the Irish bank Anglo Irish, Northern Rock which started it all, and all the other institutions that are currently in trouble – is that gigantic holes have appeared on the left-hand side of their balance sheets, where assets are listed. Those assets are for the most part linked in one way or another to the collapse in property prices in the US and elsewhere.

In other words, land speculation (the land boom and bust) is the cause of financial panics and crises and the subsequent general economic depression, as George argued more than 100 years ago.

Lanchester point out that banks by their nature have very large balance sheets and small equity compared to other businesses. (Is this the same as saying they are highly leveraged institutions?) It does not take much for them to become insolvent. But land busts typically see land values crash by 20, 30, 40 percent or more. In other words under a system of private property in land where money is loaned with land value as collateral the banking system is a disaster waiting to happen.

Henry George Has Been Proven Right

The Collapse of the Neoliberal Model

The Collapse of the Neoliberal Model
Where Russia Went Wrong

By MICHAEL HUDSON

Last week Izvestiya published an interview with former Premier Yevgeny Primakov, now president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (Johnson’s Russia List published a translation on May 8). The discussion centered on a universal problem – what China and other Asian countries, as well as OPEC and Europe should do with the export surpluses and proceeds mounting up in their central banks from mortgaging or selling off their real estate and industry. Or to put matters in retrospect, what should they have done to avoid the neoliberal monetarist ideology that governments should do nothing at all with these surpluses, not even use them to fuel economic growth.

If U.S. diplomats had their way, countries would simply let their foreign exchange reserves accumulate in the form of loans to the United States, in the form of Treasury bonds and other securities. Mr. Primakov has long opposed what his interviewer called “the fetishization of the Stabilization Fund – our beloved ‘piggy bank.’” Urging that it be spent on “primary needs,” to buy tangible capital goods, undertake infrastructure investment and finance imports to rebuild Russia’s dismantled manufacturing sector, he explained, “I was always opposed to having the Stabilization Fund considered something saved for an emergency. Money needs to be spent inside the country. Naturally not all of it. Some part should certainly be kept as a reserve.” But it was Vladimir Putin’s own “initiative to divide the Stabilization Fund into the Reserve Fund and the Fund for Well-Being. The latter was to be used to develop the economy and for social needs. It is too bad that they did not get to it in time.”

Ever since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, countries that have built up foreign exchange reserves have found themselves targets of global raiders. The tactic has been to sell a currency short, that is, to promise to deliver a few hundred million (or nowadays a few billion dollars) of it to a buyer (usually the central bank) near the current price, and then drive down the exchange rate by selling. The central bank tries in vain to absorb the selling wave, until finally its reserves are exhausted and the currency depreciates. This is how George Soros broke the Bank of England – and what he denies having done in Malaysia during the 1997 crisis.

Under Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, Malaysia protected itself by not making its currency available for foreign speculators to buy and cover their short-sale position. But most other countries have passively built up reserves in an attempt to outspend potential raiders. Today, however, underlying trends are using up these reserves. The global financial crisis has ended the real estate bubble that enabled many countries to cover their trade deficits by selling off their real estate or simply taking out foreign-currency mortgages against it. The Baltics and other post-Soviet countries in particular have been financing their trade deficits by fostering a property bubble that has led real estate owners to borrow mortgage credit from Western banks. In the absence of putting in place a viable domestic banking system, Scandinavian, Austrian and other Western banks are the only institutions able to create credit. Now that the global real estate bubble has burst, this foreign exchange credit is no longer forthcoming. The financial End Time has arrived. Rather than facing the new state of affairs – chronic trade deficits are now over-layered with heavy foreign-debt service. Countries that have built up foreign reserves are running them down.

Many countries are trying to delay the Day of Judgment by borrowing from the IMF, dissipating the proceeds by subsidizing capital flight by investors and speculators who can see that exchange rates for chronic trade-deficit countries are about to plunge steeply. Russia has joined in expending its foreign-exchange reserves to stabilize the ruble in the face of capital flight and foreign speculative selling.

In retrospect this appears to have been inevitable, and indeed was widely foreseen by critics of the neoliberal Washington Consensus. The reserves built up during the oil-price run-up last year and the recent boom in minerals prices are being spent without having used the proceeds to develop its industry so as to replace imports and develop export markets for what used to be a high-technology economy prior to the Yeltsin “reforms” (that is, dismantling of industry). Russia continued to rely almost exclusively on raw materials and oil exports. “In our country,” explained Mr. Primakov, “40% of GDP was created and is created through raw material exports. The share of industrial enterprises engaged in development and introduction of new technologies barely comes to 10%.” The problem is that having given away its mineral resources and other public enterprises to insiders and their cronies, Russia has relied on what they choose to leave in the country from their exports and sale of shares in their companies. “The prolonged refusal to inject the capital being built up into the real economy and its direct investment in American treasury securities instead of its use inside the country to diversify the economy. … As a result, Russia will most likely come out of the recession in the second echelon – after the developed countries.”

The alternative, Mr. Primakov said, would have been to use the Stabilization Fund “to switch the economy to the innovation track and for its restructuring. ‘Patching the holes does not help for long.’” But he the then-minister of economics, German Gref, fought off attempts “to cannibalize the Stabilization Fund.” Under the kleptocracy the money was left to be stolen.

The problem is where to go from here. Neoliberal “monetarist” ideology conjures up the threat of inflation to deter public spending. This IMF and World Bank propaganda blocked Russia from investing in industry during the Yeltsin disaster of the mid-1990s. “Fear of inflation,” Mr. Primakov explained, “was named as the main reason that huge amounts of money lay idle. They said that inflation would soar if what had been built up began to be spent. At one of the representative conferences, I asked: ‘What kind of inflation can there be in building roads? The work would just spur on production of concrete, cement, and metal ...’ But our financial experts have a monetarist view of inflation. They are afraid of releasing an additional money supply into circulation. But in reality inflation rises much more strongly from that fact that we have colossal monopolization.” Trade dependency leads the ruble’s exchange rate to weaken, raising the price of imports and thus aggravating the inflation – precisely the opposite of what Washington Consensus orthodoxy insists.

I myself have heard Scandinavian and other European officials make this argument in almost the same words, and it has persuaded many Third World governments to do nothing with their raw-materials export proceeds but “save for a rainy day,” not promote domestic self-sufficiency in food and consumer goods. The argument seems maddeningly stupid, because it pretends that all government spending is inherently inflationary, adding to the spending stream without producing any production to absorb it. The practical effect is to block countries from growing in the way that the United States and other developed nations have done – by investing in infrastructure and other capital formation, with the government providing basic infrastructure at cost or even freely (as in the case of roads) so as to minimize the cost of living and doing business. Instead of having investment in place to show for the foreign exchange earned by exporting raw materials (and selling off ownership of national assets), countries that follow this policy are now seeing their reserves drained rapidly. And as far as government spending is concerned, the economic collapse is increasing public budget deficits after all!

Contrast this behavior with Pres. Obama’s February 17 economic stimulus plan for the United States. When the Izvestiya interviewer asked Mr. Primakov what he thought about it, he noted that: “In America investments in ‘intellect’ have been increased – in science, progressive technologies, and education, and expenditures for medicine are rising. ... Doesn’t it seem to you that our package of anti-crisis measures is less ambitious? … This law should be considered a plan of investment related to the American economy and society entering the 21st century and a new technological platform of competitiveness. That is why expenditures for science have been increased. The same thing, undoubtedly, with human capital.”

But that is not the Russian strategy today, Mr. Primakov complained. Russia has been living in the short run. “The TPP (Chamber of Commerce and Industry) conducted a poll in 720 firms. Only a third of the managers said that they associate getting out of the crisis with producing new output. The rest are counting on staff cutbacks. If the ministries are given the assignment of reducing expenditures at their discretion, the first thing they sacrifice is scientific research and experimental design development. However, research and development should be classified as protected articles of any budget.”

So much for the free-market policy of automatic stabilizers and do-nothing government policy, leaving choice in the hands of the nation’s financial oligarchs. The situation calls for structural change, coordinated by the government. “If a plane is having trouble, the autopilot cannot handle an unusual situation. Only the personal skills of the pilot can save the ship. It is similar with the economy. Autopilot does not work in extreme conditions. … Self-regulation of the economy disappears as a factor.”

When asked about the oligarchs keeping their funds abroad rather than investing them in domestic industry, Mr. Primakov replied that Russian officials did not “take into account that banks’ interests do not coincide with the interests of the real sector of the economy. … It should have been explained that after receiving state support, in using it banks no longer [should] act as commercial structures but as agents of the state. It should have been watched to make sure that the state capital was not commingled with the banks’ other assets in common accounts but was marked off with a red line. But that was not done. Probably some people were lobbying for the banks’ interests at that point. And the bankers hurriedly began to convert the rubles into hard currency and export it abroad and build up their capitalization” instead of “extend[ing] credit to the real sector of the economy.” Oversight was done poorly, and Russia did not even use its public funds to finance capital investment. But when it comes to what to do at this late point, Mr. Primakov acknowledged, “Punishing the banks for what happened means destroying them.”

The problem is how to restructure the financial system to make it serve the objectives of industrial growth rather than merely facilitating capital flight. Throughout the world financial interests have taken control of government and used neoliberal policies to promote their own gain-seeking – financial gains without industrialization or agricultural self-sufficiency. Betting against one’s own currency is more remunerative than making the effort to invest in capital equipment and develop markets for new output. So unemployment and domestic budget deficits are soaring. The neoliberal failure to distinguish between productive and merely extractive or speculative forms of gain seeking has created a travesty of the kind of wealth creation that Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations. The financialization of economies has been decoupled from tangible capital investment to expand employment and productive powers.

Central to any discussion of financialization is the fact that credit creation has been monopolized in the United States and Britain for their own national gain. What makes this interview so relevant is that Mr. Primakov is speaking as head of Russia’s shrunken manufacturing sector. Russia “practically pushes big business outside our borders,” Mr. Primakov noted, “to borrow money from banks there in places where the interest rates are incomparably lower.” Just as the nation was becoming underdeveloped industrially, so it and other post-Soviet economies have failed to create domestic financial institutions to provide the credit that is needed to finance circulation between producers and consumers. As a result, these countries are simply fooling themselves to imagine “that credit can continue to be borrowed abroad ‘for the crisis.’ It is not out of the question that for the first time in 10 years, the state itself will even go begging for a loan again.” So a byproduct of today’s crisis will be to put the world outside of the creditor nations on rations, as it were.

Mr. Primakov was asked what he thought of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s tracing “the sources of the present Russian crisis [to] the 1990s, when the liberal government permitted the ‘stealing, squandering, and distribution of natural resources and the largest sectors of industry to those who could not support their development.’” He replied that there were many smart managers among the oligarchy’s ranks, but acknowledged that “It is a different question that in buying up enterprises (mainly raw material ones) for a song and obtaining mega-profits, many from the beginning preferred not to raise the efficiency of production, but to skim off the cream. … Why think about some processing of raw materials if they bring in big money anyway in natural form? The state should have entered that niche long ago. To have done everything to make certain that some of the petrodollars were pumped into science-intensive industry.”

Contrasting Russia’s failure to industrialize with that of China and its anticipated 8% economic growth in 2009, Mr. Primakov noted: “China exports ready-made products, while in our country a strong raw material flow was traditional.” Now that Western economies are shrinking, China is “moving a large part of the ready-made goods to the domestic market. At the same time, they are trying to raise the population's solvent demand. On this basis the plants and factories will continue to operate and the economy will work. We cannot do that. If raw materials are moved to the domestic market, consumers of such vast volumes will not be found.” Increasing domestic purchasing power will “merely step up imports.” That is the price that Russia is now paying for having failed to sponsor “structural changes in the economy.”

I have cited these long quotations because they have been made by a man who once had a chance to steer Russia along different lines than the economically suicidal death trap promoted by the Harvard Boys and their Washington Consensus. It is the trap into which the Baltics and other countries have fallen. A decade ago Mr. Primakov proposed an alternative, based on a resource-rent tax to finance Russia’s re-industrialization. The government would have collected the “free lunch” of its raw materials sales proceeds in excess of their low costs of production. Instead of retaining the revenue in the public domain from the decades of capital investment that the Soviet government had made to develop its mineral, oil and gas resources, instead of using it to finance economic modernization, Russia simply gave it away to political insiders and let them sell off shares in these resources to foreign buyers on the cheap. Anatoly Chubais and his Western “free-market” backers promised that giving property to individuals in this way would transform them into forward-looking Western-style industrialists. Instead, it turned them into Westernized finance capitalists.

The Collapse of the Neoliberal Model
Where Russia Went Wrong

By MICHAEL HUDSON

Last week Izvestiya published an interview with former Premier Yevgeny Primakov, now president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. (Johnson’s Russia List published a translation on May 8). The discussion centered on a universal problem – what China and other Asian countries, as well as OPEC and Europe should do with the export surpluses and proceeds mounting up in their central banks from mortgaging or selling off their real estate and industry. Or to put matters in retrospect, what should they have done to avoid the neoliberal monetarist ideology that governments should do nothing at all with these surpluses, not even use them to fuel economic growth.

If U.S. diplomats had their way, countries would simply let their foreign exchange reserves accumulate in the form of loans to the United States, in the form of Treasury bonds and other securities. Mr. Primakov has long opposed what his interviewer called “the fetishization of the Stabilization Fund – our beloved ‘piggy bank.’” Urging that it be spent on “primary needs,” to buy tangible capital goods, undertake infrastructure investment and finance imports to rebuild Russia’s dismantled manufacturing sector, he explained, “I was always opposed to having the Stabilization Fund considered something saved for an emergency. Money needs to be spent inside the country. Naturally not all of it. Some part should certainly be kept as a reserve.” But it was Vladimir Putin’s own “initiative to divide the Stabilization Fund into the Reserve Fund and the Fund for Well-Being. The latter was to be used to develop the economy and for social needs. It is too bad that they did not get to it in time.”

Ever since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, countries that have built up foreign exchange reserves have found themselves targets of global raiders. The tactic has been to sell a currency short, that is, to promise to deliver a few hundred million (or nowadays a few billion dollars) of it to a buyer (usually the central bank) near the current price, and then drive down the exchange rate by selling. The central bank tries in vain to absorb the selling wave, until finally its reserves are exhausted and the currency depreciates. This is how George Soros broke the Bank of England – and what he denies having done in Malaysia during the 1997 crisis.

Under Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, Malaysia protected itself by not making its currency available for foreign speculators to buy and cover their short-sale position. But most other countries have passively built up reserves in an attempt to outspend potential raiders. Today, however, underlying trends are using up these reserves. The global financial crisis has ended the real estate bubble that enabled many countries to cover their trade deficits by selling off their real estate or simply taking out foreign-currency mortgages against it. The Baltics and other post-Soviet countries in particular have been financing their trade deficits by fostering a property bubble that has led real estate owners to borrow mortgage credit from Western banks. In the absence of putting in place a viable domestic banking system, Scandinavian, Austrian and other Western banks are the only institutions able to create credit. Now that the global real estate bubble has burst, this foreign exchange credit is no longer forthcoming. The financial End Time has arrived. Rather than facing the new state of affairs – chronic trade deficits are now over-layered with heavy foreign-debt service. Countries that have built up foreign reserves are running them down.

Many countries are trying to delay the Day of Judgment by borrowing from the IMF, dissipating the proceeds by subsidizing capital flight by investors and speculators who can see that exchange rates for chronic trade-deficit countries are about to plunge steeply. Russia has joined in expending its foreign-exchange reserves to stabilize the ruble in the face of capital flight and foreign speculative selling.

In retrospect this appears to have been inevitable, and indeed was widely foreseen by critics of the neoliberal Washington Consensus. The reserves built up during the oil-price run-up last year and the recent boom in minerals prices are being spent without having used the proceeds to develop its industry so as to replace imports and develop export markets for what used to be a high-technology economy prior to the Yeltsin “reforms” (that is, dismantling of industry). Russia continued to rely almost exclusively on raw materials and oil exports. “In our country,” explained Mr. Primakov, “40% of GDP was created and is created through raw material exports. The share of industrial enterprises engaged in development and introduction of new technologies barely comes to 10%.” The problem is that having given away its mineral resources and other public enterprises to insiders and their cronies, Russia has relied on what they choose to leave in the country from their exports and sale of shares in their companies. “The prolonged refusal to inject the capital being built up into the real economy and its direct investment in American treasury securities instead of its use inside the country to diversify the economy. … As a result, Russia will most likely come out of the recession in the second echelon – after the developed countries.”

The alternative, Mr. Primakov said, would have been to use the Stabilization Fund “to switch the economy to the innovation track and for its restructuring. ‘Patching the holes does not help for long.’” But he the then-minister of economics, German Gref, fought off attempts “to cannibalize the Stabilization Fund.” Under the kleptocracy the money was left to be stolen.

The problem is where to go from here. Neoliberal “monetarist” ideology conjures up the threat of inflation to deter public spending. This IMF and World Bank propaganda blocked Russia from investing in industry during the Yeltsin disaster of the mid-1990s. “Fear of inflation,” Mr. Primakov explained, “was named as the main reason that huge amounts of money lay idle. They said that inflation would soar if what had been built up began to be spent. At one of the representative conferences, I asked: ‘What kind of inflation can there be in building roads? The work would just spur on production of concrete, cement, and metal ...’ But our financial experts have a monetarist view of inflation. They are afraid of releasing an additional money supply into circulation. But in reality inflation rises much more strongly from that fact that we have colossal monopolization.” Trade dependency leads the ruble’s exchange rate to weaken, raising the price of imports and thus aggravating the inflation – precisely the opposite of what Washington Consensus orthodoxy insists.

I myself have heard Scandinavian and other European officials make this argument in almost the same words, and it has persuaded many Third World governments to do nothing with their raw-materials export proceeds but “save for a rainy day,” not promote domestic self-sufficiency in food and consumer goods. The argument seems maddeningly stupid, because it pretends that all government spending is inherently inflationary, adding to the spending stream without producing any production to absorb it. The practical effect is to block countries from growing in the way that the United States and other developed nations have done – by investing in infrastructure and other capital formation, with the government providing basic infrastructure at cost or even freely (as in the case of roads) so as to minimize the cost of living and doing business. Instead of having investment in place to show for the foreign exchange earned by exporting raw materials (and selling off ownership of national assets), countries that follow this policy are now seeing their reserves drained rapidly. And as far as government spending is concerned, the economic collapse is increasing public budget deficits after all!

Contrast this behavior with Pres. Obama’s February 17 economic stimulus plan for the United States. When the Izvestiya interviewer asked Mr. Primakov what he thought about it, he noted that: “In America investments in ‘intellect’ have been increased – in science, progressive technologies, and education, and expenditures for medicine are rising. ... Doesn’t it seem to you that our package of anti-crisis measures is less ambitious? … This law should be considered a plan of investment related to the American economy and society entering the 21st century and a new technological platform of competitiveness. That is why expenditures for science have been increased. The same thing, undoubtedly, with human capital.”

But that is not the Russian strategy today, Mr. Primakov complained. Russia has been living in the short run. “The TPP (Chamber of Commerce and Industry) conducted a poll in 720 firms. Only a third of the managers said that they associate getting out of the crisis with producing new output. The rest are counting on staff cutbacks. If the ministries are given the assignment of reducing expenditures at their discretion, the first thing they sacrifice is scientific research and experimental design development. However, research and development should be classified as protected articles of any budget.”

So much for the free-market policy of automatic stabilizers and do-nothing government policy, leaving choice in the hands of the nation’s financial oligarchs. The situation calls for structural change, coordinated by the government. “If a plane is having trouble, the autopilot cannot handle an unusual situation. Only the personal skills of the pilot can save the ship. It is similar with the economy. Autopilot does not work in extreme conditions. … Self-regulation of the economy disappears as a factor.”

When asked about the oligarchs keeping their funds abroad rather than investing them in domestic industry, Mr. Primakov replied that Russian officials did not “take into account that banks’ interests do not coincide with the interests of the real sector of the economy. … It should have been explained that after receiving state support, in using it banks no longer [should] act as commercial structures but as agents of the state. It should have been watched to make sure that the state capital was not commingled with the banks’ other assets in common accounts but was marked off with a red line. But that was not done. Probably some people were lobbying for the banks’ interests at that point. And the bankers hurriedly began to convert the rubles into hard currency and export it abroad and build up their capitalization” instead of “extend[ing] credit to the real sector of the economy.” Oversight was done poorly, and Russia did not even use its public funds to finance capital investment. But when it comes to what to do at this late point, Mr. Primakov acknowledged, “Punishing the banks for what happened means destroying them.”

The problem is how to restructure the financial system to make it serve the objectives of industrial growth rather than merely facilitating capital flight. Throughout the world financial interests have taken control of government and used neoliberal policies to promote their own gain-seeking – financial gains without industrialization or agricultural self-sufficiency. Betting against one’s own currency is more remunerative than making the effort to invest in capital equipment and develop markets for new output. So unemployment and domestic budget deficits are soaring. The neoliberal failure to distinguish between productive and merely extractive or speculative forms of gain seeking has created a travesty of the kind of wealth creation that Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations. The financialization of economies has been decoupled from tangible capital investment to expand employment and productive powers.

Central to any discussion of financialization is the fact that credit creation has been monopolized in the United States and Britain for their own national gain. What makes this interview so relevant is that Mr. Primakov is speaking as head of Russia’s shrunken manufacturing sector. Russia “practically pushes big business outside our borders,” Mr. Primakov noted, “to borrow money from banks there in places where the interest rates are incomparably lower.” Just as the nation was becoming underdeveloped industrially, so it and other post-Soviet economies have failed to create domestic financial institutions to provide the credit that is needed to finance circulation between producers and consumers. As a result, these countries are simply fooling themselves to imagine “that credit can continue to be borrowed abroad ‘for the crisis.’ It is not out of the question that for the first time in 10 years, the state itself will even go begging for a loan again.” So a byproduct of today’s crisis will be to put the world outside of the creditor nations on rations, as it were.

Mr. Primakov was asked what he thought of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s tracing “the sources of the present Russian crisis [to] the 1990s, when the liberal government permitted the ‘stealing, squandering, and distribution of natural resources and the largest sectors of industry to those who could not support their development.’” He replied that there were many smart managers among the oligarchy’s ranks, but acknowledged that “It is a different question that in buying up enterprises (mainly raw material ones) for a song and obtaining mega-profits, many from the beginning preferred not to raise the efficiency of production, but to skim off the cream. … Why think about some processing of raw materials if they bring in big money anyway in natural form? The state should have entered that niche long ago. To have done everything to make certain that some of the petrodollars were pumped into science-intensive industry.”

Contrasting Russia’s failure to industrialize with that of China and its anticipated 8% economic growth in 2009, Mr. Primakov noted: “China exports ready-made products, while in our country a strong raw material flow was traditional.” Now that Western economies are shrinking, China is “moving a large part of the ready-made goods to the domestic market. At the same time, they are trying to raise the population's solvent demand. On this basis the plants and factories will continue to operate and the economy will work. We cannot do that. If raw materials are moved to the domestic market, consumers of such vast volumes will not be found.” Increasing domestic purchasing power will “merely step up imports.” That is the price that Russia is now paying for having failed to sponsor “structural changes in the economy.”

I have cited these long quotations because they have been made by a man who once had a chance to steer Russia along different lines than the economically suicidal death trap promoted by the Harvard Boys and their Washington Consensus. It is the trap into which the Baltics and other countries have fallen. A decade ago Mr. Primakov proposed an alternative, based on a resource-rent tax to finance Russia’s re-industrialization. The government would have collected the “free lunch” of its raw materials sales proceeds in excess of their low costs of production. Instead of retaining the revenue in the public domain from the decades of capital investment that the Soviet government had made to develop its mineral, oil and gas resources, instead of using it to finance economic modernization, Russia simply gave it away to political insiders and let them sell off shares in these resources to foreign buyers on the cheap. Anatoly Chubais and his Western “free-market” backers promised that giving property to individuals in this way would transform them into forward-looking Western-style industrialists. Instead, it turned them into Westernized finance capitalists.

The Collapse of the Neoliberal Model

The Latest in Junk Economics

The Latest in Junk Economics: Marginalist Panaceas to Today's Structural Problems

by Michael Hudson

It looks like bookstores are about to be swamped this summer and fall by a forest of advice for which publishers gave respectable advances a year ago as the economy was going off the rails. Seeking to minimize the risk of cognitive dissonance, the marketing strategy seems to be to offer advice by well-placed or celebrity insiders on how to recover the kind of free lunch that American pension plans ­ and popular hopes for easy wealth ­have long assumed to be part of the natural law of economic growth, if only it can be better managed. The fantasy that people want to buy is that the happy 1981-2007 era of debt-leveraged price gains for real estate, stocks and bonds can be brought back. But the Bubble Economy was so debt-leveraged that it cannot reasonably be restored. This means that publishers have achieved the marketer¹s dream of planned obsolescence: Readers a year or so from now will have to buy a new slew of books as they feel hungry again from the lack of intellectual protein.

For the time being we are being fed Wall Street defenses of the Bush-Obama (Paulson-Geithner) attempt to re-inflate the bubble by a bailout giveaway that has tripled America's national debt in the hope of getting bank credit (that is, more debt) growing again. The problem is that debt leveraging is what caused our economic collapse. A third of U.S. real estate is now estimated to be in negative equity, with foreclosure rates still rising. So publishers have only a short time frame to sell the current spate of books before people wake up to the fact that attempts to renew the Bubble Economy will make the financial overhead heavier.

In the face of this stultifying financial trend, the book-buying public is being fed appetizers pretending that economic recovery simply requires more 'incentives' (a euphemism for special tax breaks for the rich) to encourage more 'saving,' as if savings automatically finance new capital investment and hiring rather than what really happens: Money is being lent out to create yet more debt owed by the bottom 90 percent to the economy's top 10 percent. Publishers evidently believe that the way to attract readers ­ and certainly to get reviews in t emajor mediam­ is to propose easy
solutions. The theme of most of this year¹s bubble books therefore is how we could have avoided the bubble 'if only's' If only there had been better regulation, for instance.

But to what aim? After blaming Alan Greenspan for playing the role of 'useful idiot' by promoting deregulation and blocking prosecution of financial fraud, most writers trot out the approved panaceas: federal regulation of derivatives (or even banning them altogether), a Tobin tax on securities transactions, closure of offshore banking centers and ending their tax-avoidance stratagems. But no one is going so far as to suggest going to the root of the financial problem by removing the general tax
deductibility of interest that has subsidized debt leveraging, taxing 'capital' gains at the same rate as wages and profits, or closing the notorious tax loopholes for the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors.

Right-wing publishers are re-warming the usual panaceas such as giving more tax incentives to 'savers' (another euphemism for more giveaways to high finance) and a re-balanced federal budget to avoid 'crowding out' private finance. Wall Street's dream is to privatize Social Security to create yet a new bubble to feed off of. (Fortunately, such proposals failed during the Republican-controlled Bush administration as a result of a reality check in the form of taxpayer outrage after the dot.com bubble burst in 2000.)

What is not heard is a call to finance Social Security and Medicare out of the general budget instead of keeping their funding as a special regressive tax on labor and its employers, available for plunder by Congress to finance tax cuts for the upper wealth brackets. Yet how can America achieve industrial competitiveness in global markets with this pre-saving retirement tax and privatized health insurance, debt-leveraged
housing costs and related personal and corporate debt overhead? The rest of the world provides much lower-cost housing, health care and related costs of employee budgets ­ or simply keeps labor near subsistence levels. This is a major problem with today¹s dreams of a renewed Bubble Economy: They leave out the international dimension.

The latest panacea being offered is to rebuild America's depleted infrastructure. Alas, Wall Street plans to do this Tony Blair-style, by public-private partnerships that incorporate enormous flows of interest payments into the price structure while providing underwriting and management fees to Wall Street. Falling employment and property prices have squeezed public finances so that new infrastructure investment will take the form of installing privatized tollbooths over the economy's most critical access points such as roads and other hitherto public transportation, communications and clean water.

Surprisingly, one does not hear even an echo of calls to restore state and local property taxes to their Progressive Era levels so as to collect the 'free lunch' of land rent and use its gains over time as the main fiscal base. This would hold down land prices (and hence, mortgage debt) by preventing rising location values from being capitalized and paid out as interest to the banks. It would have the additional advantage of shifting the fiscal burden off income and sales (a policy that raises the
price of labor, goods and services). Instead, most reforms today call for
further cutting property taxes to promote more 'wealth creation' in the form of higher debt-leveraged property price inflation. The idea is to leave more rental income to be capitalized into yet larger mortgages and paid out as interest to the financial sector. Instead of housing prices falling and income and sales taxes being reduced, rising site values merely will be paid to the banks, not to the local tax authorities. The latter are forced to shift the fiscal burden onto consumers and business.

The problem is that this new wave of reformist books advocates merely marginal changes to deep structural problems. There are the usual pro forma calls to re-industrialize America, but not to address the financial debt dynamic that has undercut industrial capitalism in this country and abroad. How will these timid 'reforms' look in retrospect a decade from now? The Bush-Obama bailout pretends that banks 'too-big-to-fail' only face a liquidity problem, not a bad debt problem in the face of the economy's widening inability to pay. The reason why past bubbles cannot be recovered is that they have reached their debt limit, not only domestically, but also
the international political limit of global Dollar Hegemony.

What needs to be written about is what the marginalists leave out of account and what academic jargon calls ³exogenous² considerations, which turn out to be what economics really is all about: the debt overhead; financial fraud and crime in general (one of the economy's highest-paying sectors); military spending (a key to the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and hence to the buildup of central bank dollar reserves throughout the world); the proliferation of unearned income and insider political dealing.

These are the core phenomena that 'free market' idea strippers have relegated to the 'institutionalist' basement of the academic economics curriculum.

For example, the press keeps on parroting the Washington line that Asians 'save' too much, causing them to lend their money to America. But the 'Asians' saving these dollars are the central banks. Individuals and companies save in yuan and yen, not dollars. It is not these domestic savings that China and Japan have placed in U.S. Treasury securities to the tune of $3 trillion. It is America's own spending ­ the trillions of dollars its payments deficit is pumping abroad, in excess of foreign demand for U.S. exports and purchases of U.S. companies, stocks and real estate. This
payments deficit is not the result of U.S. consumers maxing out on their credit cards. What is being downplayed is the military spending that has underlain the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit ever since the Korean War. It is a trend that cannot continue much longer, now that foreign countries are starting to push back.

Inasmuch as China's central bank is now the largest holder of U.S. Government and other dollar securities, it has become the main subsidizer of the U.S. payments deficit ­ and also the domestic U.S. federal budget deficit. Half of the federal budget's discretionary spending is military in character. This places China in the uncomfortable position of being the largest financier of U.S. military adventurism, including U.S. attempts to encircle China and Russia militarily to block their development as rivals over the past fifty years. That is not what China intended, but it is the effect of global dollar hegemony.

Another trend that cannot continue is 'the miracle of compound interest.' It is called a 'miracle' because it seems too good to be true, and it is ­ it cannot really go on for long. Heavily leveraged debts go bad in the end, because they accrue interest charges faster than the economy's ability to pay. Basing national policy on dreams of paying the interest by borrowing money against steadily inflated asset prices has been a nightmare for homebuyers and consumers, as well as for companies targeted by financial raiders who use debt leverage to strip assets for themselves. This policy is
now being applied to public infrastructure into the hands of absentee owners, who will build interest charges into the new service prices they charge, and be allowed to treat these charges as a tax-deductible expense. Banking lobbyists have shaped the tax system in a way that steers new absentee investment into debt rather than equity financing.

The irresponsible cheerleaders applauding a bubble economy as 'wealth creation' (to use one of Alan Greenspan's favorite phrases) would like us, their audience, to believe that they knew that there was a problem all along, but simply could not restrain the economy's 'irrational exuberance' and 'animal spirits.' The idea is to blame the victims ­homeowners forced into debt to afford access to housing, pension-fund savers forced to consign their wage set-asides to money managers for the large Wall Street firms, and companies seeking to stave off corporate raiders by taking 'poison pills' in the form of debts large enough to block their being taken
over. One looks in vain for an honest acknowledgement of how the financial sector turned into a Mafia-style gang more akin to post-Soviet kleptocrat insiders than to Schumpeterian innovators.

The cursorily reformist gaggle of post-bubble tomes assumes that we have reached 'the end of history' as far as big problems are concerned. What is missing is a critique of the big picture­ how Wall Street has financialized the public domain to inaugurate a neo-feudal toll booth economy while privatizing the government itself, headed by the Treasury and Federal Reserve. Left untouched is the story how industrial capitalism has succumbed to an insatiable and unsustainable finance capitalism, whose newest 'final stage' seems to be a zero-sum game of casino capitalism based on derivative
swaps and kindred hedge fund gambling innovations.

What have been lost are the Progressive Era's two great reforms. First, minimizing the economy¹s free lunch of unearned income (e.g., monopolistic privilege and privatization of the public domain in contrast to one's own labor and enterprise) by taxing absentee property rent and asset-price ('capital') gains, keeping natural monopolies in the public domain, and anti-trust regulation. The aim of progressive economic justice was to prevent exploitation ­ e.g., charging more than the technologically necessary costs of production and reasonable profits warranted. This aim had a fortuitous byproduct that made the Progressive Era reforms seem likely to
conquer the world in a Darwinian evolutionary manner: Minimization of the
free lunch enabled economies such as the United States to out-compete others
that didn't enact progressive fiscal and financial policy.

A second Progressive Era aim was to steer the financial sector so as to fund capital formation. Industrial credit was best achieved in Germany and Central Europe in the decades prior to World War I. But the Allied victory led to the dominance of Anglo-American banking practice based on loans against property or income streams already in place. Today's bank credit has become decoupled from capital formation, taking the form mainly of mortgage credit (80%), and loans secured by corporate stock (for mergers, acquisitions and corporate raids) as well as for speculation. The effect is to spur asset-price inflation on credit, in ways that benefit the few at the
expense of the economy at large.

The problem of debt-leveraged asset-price inflation is clearest in the post-Soviet 'Baltic syndrome,' to which Britain's economy is now succumbing. Debts are run up in foreign currency (real estate mortgages in the Baltics, tax-avoidance funds and flight capital in Britain), without exports having any prospect of covering their carrying charges as far as the eye can see. The result is a debt trap ­ chronic austerity for the domestic market, causing lower capital investment and living standards without hope of recovery.

These problems illustrate the extent to which the world economy as a whole has pursued the wrong course since World War I. This long detour has been facilitated by the failure of socialism to provide a viable alternative. Although Russia's bureaucratic Stalinism got rid of the post-feudal free lunch of land rent, monopoly rent, interest and financial or property-price gains, its bureaucratic overhead overpowered the economy in the end. Russia fell. The question is whether the Anglo-American brand of
finance capitalism will follow suit from its own internal contradictions.

The flaws in the U.S. economy are tragic because they are so intractable, embedded as they are in the very core of post-feudal Western economies. This is what Greek tragedy is about: a tragic flaw that dooms the hero from the outset. The main flaw embedded in our own economy is rising debt in excess of the ability to pay is part of a larger flaw: the financial free lunch that property and financial claims extract in excess of a corresponding cost as measured in labor effort or an equitably shared tax burden (the classical theory of economic rent). Like land seizure and insider privatization deals, such wealth increasingly can be inherited, stolen or obtained by political corruption. Wealth and revenue extracted via today¹s finance capitalism avoids taxation, thereby receiving an actual fiscal subsidy as compared to tangible industrial investment and operating profit. Yet academics and the popular media treat these core flaws as 'exogenous,' that is, outside the realm of economics analysis.

Unfortunately for us ­ and for reformers trying to rescue our post-bubble economy the history of economic thought has been suppressed to give an impression that today¹s stripped-down, largely trivialized junk economics is the apex of Western social history. One would not realize from the present discussion that for the past few centuries a different canon of logic existed. Classical economists distinguished between earned income (wages and profits) and unearned income (land rent, monopoly rent and interest). The effect was to distinguish between wealth earned through
capital and enterprise that reflects labor effort, and unearned wealth from
appropriation of land and other natural resources, monopoly privileges
(including banking and money management) and inflationary asset-price 'capital' gains. But even the Progressive Era did not go much beyond seeking to purify industrial capitalism from the carry-overs of feudalism: land rent and monopoly rent stemming from military conquest, and financial exploitation by banks and (in America) Wall Street as the 'mother of trusts.'

What makes today's bubble different from previous ones is that instead of being organized by governments as a stratagem to dispose of their public debt by creating or privatizing monopolies to sell off for payment in government bonds, the United States and other nations today are going deeply into debt simply to pay bankers for bad loans. The economy is being sacrificed to reward finance, instead of finance subordinating and channeling finance to promote economic growth and lower the economy-wide cost structure to remain viable. Interest-bearing debt is weighing down the economy and causing debt deflation by diverting saving into debt payments
instead of capital investment. Under this condition 'saving' is not the solution to today's economic shrinkage; it is part of the problem. In contrast to the personal hoarding of Keynes's day, the problem is the financial sector's extractive power as creditor instead of clear the slate by wiping out the economy's bad-debt overhang in the historically normal way, by a wave of bankruptcy.

Today, the financial sector is translating its affluence (at taxpayer expense), into the political power to pry yet more public infrastructure away from state and local communities and from the public domain at the national level, Thatcher- and Blair-style as it is sold off to absentee buyers-on-credit to pay off public debt (while cutting taxes on wealth yet further). No one remembers the cry for what Keynes called 'euthanasia of the rentier.' We have entered the most oppressive rentier epoch since feudal European times. Instead of providing basic infrastructure services at cost or subsidized rates to lower the national cost structure and thus make it more affordable ­ and internationally competitiv ­ the economy is being turned into a collection of tollbooths How strange that this year's transitory wave of post-bubble books fails to place the financialization of the U.S. and global economies in this long-term context.

The Latest in Junk Economics: Marginalist Panaceas to Today's Structural Problems

by Michael Hudson

It looks like bookstores are about to be swamped this summer and fall by a forest of advice for which publishers gave respectable advances a year ago as the economy was going off the rails. Seeking to minimize the risk of cognitive dissonance, the marketing strategy seems to be to offer advice by well-placed or celebrity insiders on how to recover the kind of free lunch that American pension plans ­ and popular hopes for easy wealth ­have long assumed to be part of the natural law of economic growth, if only it can be better managed. The fantasy that people want to buy is that the happy 1981-2007 era of debt-leveraged price gains for real estate, stocks and bonds can be brought back. But the Bubble Economy was so debt-leveraged that it cannot reasonably be restored. This means that publishers have achieved the marketer¹s dream of planned obsolescence: Readers a year or so from now will have to buy a new slew of books as they feel hungry again from the lack of intellectual protein.

For the time being we are being fed Wall Street defenses of the Bush-Obama (Paulson-Geithner) attempt to re-inflate the bubble by a bailout giveaway that has tripled America's national debt in the hope of getting bank credit (that is, more debt) growing again. The problem is that debt leveraging is what caused our economic collapse. A third of U.S. real estate is now estimated to be in negative equity, with foreclosure rates still rising. So publishers have only a short time frame to sell the current spate of books before people wake up to the fact that attempts to renew the Bubble Economy will make the financial overhead heavier.

In the face of this stultifying financial trend, the book-buying public is being fed appetizers pretending that economic recovery simply requires more 'incentives' (a euphemism for special tax breaks for the rich) to encourage more 'saving,' as if savings automatically finance new capital investment and hiring rather than what really happens: Money is being lent out to create yet more debt owed by the bottom 90 percent to the economy's top 10 percent. Publishers evidently believe that the way to attract readers ­ and certainly to get reviews in t emajor mediam­ is to propose easy
solutions. The theme of most of this year¹s bubble books therefore is how we could have avoided the bubble 'if only's' If only there had been better regulation, for instance.

But to what aim? After blaming Alan Greenspan for playing the role of 'useful idiot' by promoting deregulation and blocking prosecution of financial fraud, most writers trot out the approved panaceas: federal regulation of derivatives (or even banning them altogether), a Tobin tax on securities transactions, closure of offshore banking centers and ending their tax-avoidance stratagems. But no one is going so far as to suggest going to the root of the financial problem by removing the general tax
deductibility of interest that has subsidized debt leveraging, taxing 'capital' gains at the same rate as wages and profits, or closing the notorious tax loopholes for the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors.

Right-wing publishers are re-warming the usual panaceas such as giving more tax incentives to 'savers' (another euphemism for more giveaways to high finance) and a re-balanced federal budget to avoid 'crowding out' private finance. Wall Street's dream is to privatize Social Security to create yet a new bubble to feed off of. (Fortunately, such proposals failed during the Republican-controlled Bush administration as a result of a reality check in the form of taxpayer outrage after the dot.com bubble burst in 2000.)

What is not heard is a call to finance Social Security and Medicare out of the general budget instead of keeping their funding as a special regressive tax on labor and its employers, available for plunder by Congress to finance tax cuts for the upper wealth brackets. Yet how can America achieve industrial competitiveness in global markets with this pre-saving retirement tax and privatized health insurance, debt-leveraged
housing costs and related personal and corporate debt overhead? The rest of the world provides much lower-cost housing, health care and related costs of employee budgets ­ or simply keeps labor near subsistence levels. This is a major problem with today¹s dreams of a renewed Bubble Economy: They leave out the international dimension.

The latest panacea being offered is to rebuild America's depleted infrastructure. Alas, Wall Street plans to do this Tony Blair-style, by public-private partnerships that incorporate enormous flows of interest payments into the price structure while providing underwriting and management fees to Wall Street. Falling employment and property prices have squeezed public finances so that new infrastructure investment will take the form of installing privatized tollbooths over the economy's most critical access points such as roads and other hitherto public transportation, communications and clean water.

Surprisingly, one does not hear even an echo of calls to restore state and local property taxes to their Progressive Era levels so as to collect the 'free lunch' of land rent and use its gains over time as the main fiscal base. This would hold down land prices (and hence, mortgage debt) by preventing rising location values from being capitalized and paid out as interest to the banks. It would have the additional advantage of shifting the fiscal burden off income and sales (a policy that raises the
price of labor, goods and services). Instead, most reforms today call for
further cutting property taxes to promote more 'wealth creation' in the form of higher debt-leveraged property price inflation. The idea is to leave more rental income to be capitalized into yet larger mortgages and paid out as interest to the financial sector. Instead of housing prices falling and income and sales taxes being reduced, rising site values merely will be paid to the banks, not to the local tax authorities. The latter are forced to shift the fiscal burden onto consumers and business.

The problem is that this new wave of reformist books advocates merely marginal changes to deep structural problems. There are the usual pro forma calls to re-industrialize America, but not to address the financial debt dynamic that has undercut industrial capitalism in this country and abroad. How will these timid 'reforms' look in retrospect a decade from now? The Bush-Obama bailout pretends that banks 'too-big-to-fail' only face a liquidity problem, not a bad debt problem in the face of the economy's widening inability to pay. The reason why past bubbles cannot be recovered is that they have reached their debt limit, not only domestically, but also
the international political limit of global Dollar Hegemony.

What needs to be written about is what the marginalists leave out of account and what academic jargon calls ³exogenous² considerations, which turn out to be what economics really is all about: the debt overhead; financial fraud and crime in general (one of the economy's highest-paying sectors); military spending (a key to the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and hence to the buildup of central bank dollar reserves throughout the world); the proliferation of unearned income and insider political dealing.

These are the core phenomena that 'free market' idea strippers have relegated to the 'institutionalist' basement of the academic economics curriculum.

For example, the press keeps on parroting the Washington line that Asians 'save' too much, causing them to lend their money to America. But the 'Asians' saving these dollars are the central banks. Individuals and companies save in yuan and yen, not dollars. It is not these domestic savings that China and Japan have placed in U.S. Treasury securities to the tune of $3 trillion. It is America's own spending ­ the trillions of dollars its payments deficit is pumping abroad, in excess of foreign demand for U.S. exports and purchases of U.S. companies, stocks and real estate. This
payments deficit is not the result of U.S. consumers maxing out on their credit cards. What is being downplayed is the military spending that has underlain the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit ever since the Korean War. It is a trend that cannot continue much longer, now that foreign countries are starting to push back.

Inasmuch as China's central bank is now the largest holder of U.S. Government and other dollar securities, it has become the main subsidizer of the U.S. payments deficit ­ and also the domestic U.S. federal budget deficit. Half of the federal budget's discretionary spending is military in character. This places China in the uncomfortable position of being the largest financier of U.S. military adventurism, including U.S. attempts to encircle China and Russia militarily to block their development as rivals over the past fifty years. That is not what China intended, but it is the effect of global dollar hegemony.

Another trend that cannot continue is 'the miracle of compound interest.' It is called a 'miracle' because it seems too good to be true, and it is ­ it cannot really go on for long. Heavily leveraged debts go bad in the end, because they accrue interest charges faster than the economy's ability to pay. Basing national policy on dreams of paying the interest by borrowing money against steadily inflated asset prices has been a nightmare for homebuyers and consumers, as well as for companies targeted by financial raiders who use debt leverage to strip assets for themselves. This policy is
now being applied to public infrastructure into the hands of absentee owners, who will build interest charges into the new service prices they charge, and be allowed to treat these charges as a tax-deductible expense. Banking lobbyists have shaped the tax system in a way that steers new absentee investment into debt rather than equity financing.

The irresponsible cheerleaders applauding a bubble economy as 'wealth creation' (to use one of Alan Greenspan's favorite phrases) would like us, their audience, to believe that they knew that there was a problem all along, but simply could not restrain the economy's 'irrational exuberance' and 'animal spirits.' The idea is to blame the victims ­homeowners forced into debt to afford access to housing, pension-fund savers forced to consign their wage set-asides to money managers for the large Wall Street firms, and companies seeking to stave off corporate raiders by taking 'poison pills' in the form of debts large enough to block their being taken
over. One looks in vain for an honest acknowledgement of how the financial sector turned into a Mafia-style gang more akin to post-Soviet kleptocrat insiders than to Schumpeterian innovators.

The cursorily reformist gaggle of post-bubble tomes assumes that we have reached 'the end of history' as far as big problems are concerned. What is missing is a critique of the big picture­ how Wall Street has financialized the public domain to inaugurate a neo-feudal toll booth economy while privatizing the government itself, headed by the Treasury and Federal Reserve. Left untouched is the story how industrial capitalism has succumbed to an insatiable and unsustainable finance capitalism, whose newest 'final stage' seems to be a zero-sum game of casino capitalism based on derivative
swaps and kindred hedge fund gambling innovations.

What have been lost are the Progressive Era's two great reforms. First, minimizing the economy¹s free lunch of unearned income (e.g., monopolistic privilege and privatization of the public domain in contrast to one's own labor and enterprise) by taxing absentee property rent and asset-price ('capital') gains, keeping natural monopolies in the public domain, and anti-trust regulation. The aim of progressive economic justice was to prevent exploitation ­ e.g., charging more than the technologically necessary costs of production and reasonable profits warranted. This aim had a fortuitous byproduct that made the Progressive Era reforms seem likely to
conquer the world in a Darwinian evolutionary manner: Minimization of the
free lunch enabled economies such as the United States to out-compete others
that didn't enact progressive fiscal and financial policy.

A second Progressive Era aim was to steer the financial sector so as to fund capital formation. Industrial credit was best achieved in Germany and Central Europe in the decades prior to World War I. But the Allied victory led to the dominance of Anglo-American banking practice based on loans against property or income streams already in place. Today's bank credit has become decoupled from capital formation, taking the form mainly of mortgage credit (80%), and loans secured by corporate stock (for mergers, acquisitions and corporate raids) as well as for speculation. The effect is to spur asset-price inflation on credit, in ways that benefit the few at the
expense of the economy at large.

The problem of debt-leveraged asset-price inflation is clearest in the post-Soviet 'Baltic syndrome,' to which Britain's economy is now succumbing. Debts are run up in foreign currency (real estate mortgages in the Baltics, tax-avoidance funds and flight capital in Britain), without exports having any prospect of covering their carrying charges as far as the eye can see. The result is a debt trap ­ chronic austerity for the domestic market, causing lower capital investment and living standards without hope of recovery.

These problems illustrate the extent to which the world economy as a whole has pursued the wrong course since World War I. This long detour has been facilitated by the failure of socialism to provide a viable alternative. Although Russia's bureaucratic Stalinism got rid of the post-feudal free lunch of land rent, monopoly rent, interest and financial or property-price gains, its bureaucratic overhead overpowered the economy in the end. Russia fell. The question is whether the Anglo-American brand of
finance capitalism will follow suit from its own internal contradictions.

The flaws in the U.S. economy are tragic because they are so intractable, embedded as they are in the very core of post-feudal Western economies. This is what Greek tragedy is about: a tragic flaw that dooms the hero from the outset. The main flaw embedded in our own economy is rising debt in excess of the ability to pay is part of a larger flaw: the financial free lunch that property and financial claims extract in excess of a corresponding cost as measured in labor effort or an equitably shared tax burden (the classical theory of economic rent). Like land seizure and insider privatization deals, such wealth increasingly can be inherited, stolen or obtained by political corruption. Wealth and revenue extracted via today¹s finance capitalism avoids taxation, thereby receiving an actual fiscal subsidy as compared to tangible industrial investment and operating profit. Yet academics and the popular media treat these core flaws as 'exogenous,' that is, outside the realm of economics analysis.

Unfortunately for us ­ and for reformers trying to rescue our post-bubble economy the history of economic thought has been suppressed to give an impression that today¹s stripped-down, largely trivialized junk economics is the apex of Western social history. One would not realize from the present discussion that for the past few centuries a different canon of logic existed. Classical economists distinguished between earned income (wages and profits) and unearned income (land rent, monopoly rent and interest). The effect was to distinguish between wealth earned through
capital and enterprise that reflects labor effort, and unearned wealth from
appropriation of land and other natural resources, monopoly privileges
(including banking and money management) and inflationary asset-price 'capital' gains. But even the Progressive Era did not go much beyond seeking to purify industrial capitalism from the carry-overs of feudalism: land rent and monopoly rent stemming from military conquest, and financial exploitation by banks and (in America) Wall Street as the 'mother of trusts.'

What makes today's bubble different from previous ones is that instead of being organized by governments as a stratagem to dispose of their public debt by creating or privatizing monopolies to sell off for payment in government bonds, the United States and other nations today are going deeply into debt simply to pay bankers for bad loans. The economy is being sacrificed to reward finance, instead of finance subordinating and channeling finance to promote economic growth and lower the economy-wide cost structure to remain viable. Interest-bearing debt is weighing down the economy and causing debt deflation by diverting saving into debt payments
instead of capital investment. Under this condition 'saving' is not the solution to today's economic shrinkage; it is part of the problem. In contrast to the personal hoarding of Keynes's day, the problem is the financial sector's extractive power as creditor instead of clear the slate by wiping out the economy's bad-debt overhang in the historically normal way, by a wave of bankruptcy.

Today, the financial sector is translating its affluence (at taxpayer expense), into the political power to pry yet more public infrastructure away from state and local communities and from the public domain at the national level, Thatcher- and Blair-style as it is sold off to absentee buyers-on-credit to pay off public debt (while cutting taxes on wealth yet further). No one remembers the cry for what Keynes called 'euthanasia of the rentier.' We have entered the most oppressive rentier epoch since feudal European times. Instead of providing basic infrastructure services at cost or subsidized rates to lower the national cost structure and thus make it more affordable ­ and internationally competitiv ­ the economy is being turned into a collection of tollbooths How strange that this year's transitory wave of post-bubble books fails to place the financialization of the U.S. and global economies in this long-term context.

The Latest in Junk Economics

Does the US Face G20 Mutiny? Financing the Empire

By MICHAEL HUDSON

I am travelling in Europe for three weeks to discuss the global financial crisis with government officials, politicians and labor leaders. What is most remarkable is how differently the financial problem is perceived over here. It’s like being in another economic universe, not just another continent.

The U.S. media are silent about the most important topic policy makers are discussing here (and I suspect in Asia too): how to protect their countries from three inter-related dynamics:

(1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers;

(2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media,

(3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit.

Strange as it may seem – and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy – the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire – effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills – U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.

To date, countries have been as powerless to defend themselves against the fact that this compulsory financing of U.S. military spending is built into the global financial system. Neoliberal economists applaud this as “equilibrium,” as if it is part of economic nature and “free markets” rather than bare-knuckle diplomacy wielded with increasing aggressiveness by U.S. officials. The mass media chime in, pretending that recycling the dollar glut to finance U.S. military spending is “showing their faith in U.S. economic strength” by sending “their” dollars here to “invest.” It is as if a choice is involved, not financial and diplomatic compulsion to choose merely between “Yes” (from China, reluctantly), “Yes, please” (from Japan and the European Union) and “Yes, thank you” (Britain, Georgia and Australia).

It is not “foreign faith in the U.S. economy” that leads foreigners to “put their money here.” That’s a silly cartoon of a more sinister dynamic. The “foreigners” in question are not consumers buying U.S. exports, nor are they private-sector “investors” buying U.S. stocks and bonds. The largest and most important foreign entities putting “their money” here are central banks, and it is not “their money” at all. They are sending back the dollars that foreign exporters and other recipients turn over to their central banks for domestic currency.

When the U.S. payments deficit pumps dollars into foreign economies, these banks are being given little option except to buy U.S. Treasury bills and bonds – which the Treasury spends on financing an enormous, hostile military build-up to encircle the major dollar-recyclers – China, Japan and Arab OPEC oil producers. Yet these governments are forced to recycle dollar inflows in a way that funds U.S. military policies in which they have no say in formulating, and which threaten them more and more belligerently. That is why China and Russia took the lead in forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a few years ago.

Here in Europe there is a clear awareness that the U.S. payments deficit is much larger than just the trade deficit. One need merely look at Table 5 of the U.S. balance-of-payments data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and published by the Dept. of Commerce in its Survey of Current Business to see that the deficit does not stem merely from consumers buying more imports than the United States exports as the financial sector de-industrializes its economy. U.S. imports are now plunging as the economy shrinks and consumers are now finding themselves obliged to pay down the debts they have taken on.

Congress has told foreign investors in the largest dollar holder, China, not to buy anything except perhaps used-car dealerships and maybe more packaged mortgages and Fannie Mae stock – the equivalent of Japanese investors being steered into spending $1 billion for Rockefeller Center, on which they subsequently took a 100 per cent loss, and Saudi investment in Citigroup. That’s the kind of “international equilibrium” that U.S. officials love to see. “CNOOK go home” is the motto when it comes to serious attempts by foreign governments and their sovereign wealth funds (central bank departments trying to figure out what to do with their dollar glut) to make direct investments in American industry.

So we are left with the extent to which the U.S. payments deficit stems from military spending. The problem is not only the war in Iraq, now being extended to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the expensive build-up of U.S. military bases in Asian, European, post-Soviet and Third World countries. The Obama administration has promised to make the actual amount of this military spending more transparent. That presumably means publishing a revised set of balance of payments figures as well as domestic federal budget statistics.

The military overhead is much like a debt overhead, extracting revenue from the economy. In this case it is to pay the military-industrial complex, not merely Wall Street banks and other financial institutions. The domestic federal budget deficit does not stem only from “priming the pump” to give away enormous sums to create a new financial oligarchy. It contains an enormous and rapidly growing military component.

So Europeans and Asians see U.S. companies pumping more and more dollars into their economies. Not just to buy their exports in excess of providing them with goods and services in return; not just to buy their companies and “commanding heights” of privatized public enterprises without giving them reciprocal rights to buy important U.S. companies (remember the U.S. turn-down of China’s attempt to buy into the U.S. oil distribution business); not just to buy foreign stocks, bonds and real estate. The U.S. media somehow neglect to mention that the U.S. government is spending hundreds of billions of dollars abroad – not only in the Near East for direct combat, but to build enormous military bases to encircle the rest of the world, to install radar systems, guided missile systems and other forms of military coercion, including the “color revolutions” that have been funded – and are still being funded – all around the former Soviet Union.

Pallets of shrink-wrapped $100 bills adding up to tens of millions of the dollars at a time have become familiar “visuals” on some TV broadcasts, but the link is not made with U.S. military and diplomatic spending and foreign central-bank dollar holdings, which are reported simply as “wonderful faith in the U.S. economic recovery” and presumably the “monetary magic” being worked by Wall Street’s Tim Geithner at Treasury and Helicopter Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve.

Here’s the problem: The Coca Cola company recently tried to buy China’s largest fruit-juice producer and distributor. China already holds nearly $2 trillion in U.S. securities – way more than it needs or can use, inasmuch as the United States government refuses to let it buy meaningful U.S. companies. If the U.S. buyout would have been permitted to go through, this would have confronted China with a dilemma: Choice #1 would be to let the sale go through and accept payment in dollars, reinvesting them in what the U.S. Treasury tells it to do – U.S. Treasury bonds yielding about 1 per cent. China would take a capital loss on these when U.S. interest rates rise or when the dollar declines as the United States alone is pursuing expansionary Keynesian policies in an attempt to enable the U.S. economy to carry its debt overhead.

Choice #2 is not to recycle the dollar inflows. This would lead the renminbi to rise against the dollar, thereby eroding China’s export competitiveness in world markets. So China chose a third way, which brought U.S. protests. It turned the sale of its tangible company for merely “paper” U.S. dollars – which went with the “choice” to fund further U.S. military encirclement of the Shanghai Cooperative Agreement. The only people who seem not to be drawing this connection are the American mass media, and hence public. I can assure you from personal experience, it is being drawn here in Europe. (Here’s a good diplomatic question to discuss: Which will be the first European country besides Russia to join the S.C.O.?)

Academic textbooks have nothing to say about how “equilibrium” in foreign capital movements – speculative as well as for direct investment – is infinite as far as the U.S. economy is concerned. The U.S. economy can create dollars freely, now that they no longer are convertible into gold or even into purchases of U.S. companies, inasmuch as America remains the world’s most protected economy. It alone is permitted to protect its agriculture by import quotas, having “grandfathered” these into world trade rules half a century ago. Congress refuses to let “sovereign wealth” funds invest in important U.S. sectors.

So we are confronted with the fact that the U.S. Treasury prefers foreign central banks to keep on funding its domestic budget deficit, which means financing the cost of America’s war in the Near East and encirclement of foreign countries with rings of military bases. The more “capital outflows” U.S. investors spend to buy up foreign economies –the most profitable sectors, where the new U.S. owners can extract the highest monopoly rents – the more funds end up in foreign central banks to support America’s global military build-up. No textbook on political theory or international relations has suggested axioms to explain how nations act in a way so adverse to their own political, military and economic interests. Yet this is just what has been happening for the past generation.

So the ultimate question turns out to be what countries can do to counter this financial attack. A Basque labor union asked me whether I thought that controlling speculative capital movements would ensure that the financial system would act in the public interest. Or is outright nationalization necessary to better develop the real economy?

It is not simply a problem of “regulation” or “control of speculative capital movements.” The question is how nations can act as real nations, in their own interest rather than being roped into serving whatever the American government decides is in America’s interest.

Any country trying to do what the United States has done for the past 150 years is accused of being “socialist” – and this from the most anti-socialist economy in the world, except when it calls bailouts for its banks “socialism for the rich,” a.k.a. financial oligarchy. This rhetorical inflation almost leaves no alternative but outright nationalization of credit as a basic public utility.

Of course, the word “nationalization” has become a synonym for bailing out the largest and most reckless banks from their bad loans, and bailing out hedge funds and non-bank counterparties for losses on “casino capitalism,” gambling on derivatives that AIG and other insurers or players on the losing side of these gambles are unable to pay. Bailout in this form is not nationalization in the traditional sense of the term – bringing credit creation and other basic financial functions back into the public domain. It is the opposite. It prints new government bonds to turn over – along with self-regulatory power – to the financial sector, blocking the citizenry from taking back these functions.

Framing the issue as a choice between democracy and oligarchy turns the question into one of who will control the government doing the regulation and “nationalizing.” If it is done by a government whose central bank and major congressional committees dealing with finance are run by Wall Street, this will not help steer credit into productive uses. It will merely continue the Greenspan-Paulson-Geithner era of more and larger free lunches for their financial constituencies.

The financial oligarchy’s idea of “regulation” is to make sure that deregulators are installed in the key positions and given only a minimal skeleton staff and little funding. Despite Alan Greenspan’s announcement that he has come to see the light and realizes that self-regulation doesn’t work, the Treasury is still run by a Wall Street official and the Fed is run by a lobbyist for Wall Street. To lobbyists the real concern isn’t ideology as such – it’s naked self-interest for their clients. They may seek out well-meaning fools, especially prestigious figures from academia. But these are only front men, headed as they are by the followers of Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago. Such individuals are put in place as “gate-keepers” of the major academic journals to keep out ideas that do not well serve the financial lobbyists.

This pretence for excluding government from meaningful regulation is that finance is so technical that only someone from the financial “industry” is capable of regulating it. To add insult to injury, the additional counter-intuitive claim is made that a hallmark of democracy is to make the central bank “independent” of elected government. In reality, of course, that is just the opposite of democracy. Finance is the crux of the economic system. If it is not regulated democratically in the public interest, then it is “free” to be captured by special interests. So this becomes the oligarchic definition of “market freedom.”

The danger is that governments will let the financial sector determine how “regulation” will be applied. Special interests seek to make money from the economy, and the financial sector does this in an extractive way. That is its marketing plan. Finance today is acting in a way that de-industrializes economies, not builds them up. The “plan” is austerity for labor, industry and all sectors outside of finance, as in the IMF programs imposed on hapless Third World debtor countries. The experience of Iceland, Latvia and other “financialized” economies should be examined as object lessons, if only because they top the World Bank’s ranking of countries in terms of the “ease of doing business.”

The only meaningful regulation can come from outside the financial sector. Otherwise, countries will suffer what the Japanese call “descent from heaven”: regulators are selected from the ranks of bankers and their “useful idiots.” Upon retiring from government they return to the financial sector to receive lucrative jobs, “speaking engagements” and kindred paybacks. Knowing this, they regulate in favor of financial special interests, not that of the public at large.

The problem of speculative capital movements goes beyond drawing up a set of specific regulations. It concerns the scope of national government power. The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement prevent countries from restoring the “dual exchange rate” systems that many retained down through the 1950s and even into the ‘60s. It was widespread practice for countries to have one exchange rate for goods and services (sometimes various exchange rates for different import and export categories) and another for “capital movements.” Under American pressure, the IMF enforced the pretence that there is an “equilibrium” rate that just happens to be the same for goods and services as it is for capital movements. Governments that did not buy into this ideology were excluded from membership in the IMF and World Bank – or were overthrown.

The implication today is that the only way a nation can block capital movements is to withdraw from the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For the first time since the 1950s this looks like a real possibility, thanks to worldwide awareness of how the U.S. economy is glutting the global economy with surplus “paper” dollars – and U.S. intransigence at stopping its free ride. From the U.S. vantage point, this is nothing less than an attempt to curtail its international military program.

Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist. A Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) He can be at: mh@michael-hudson.com

By MICHAEL HUDSON

I am travelling in Europe for three weeks to discuss the global financial crisis with government officials, politicians and labor leaders. What is most remarkable is how differently the financial problem is perceived over here. It’s like being in another economic universe, not just another continent.

The U.S. media are silent about the most important topic policy makers are discussing here (and I suspect in Asia too): how to protect their countries from three inter-related dynamics:

(1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers;

(2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media,

(3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit.

Strange as it may seem – and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy – the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire – effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills – U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.

To date, countries have been as powerless to defend themselves against the fact that this compulsory financing of U.S. military spending is built into the global financial system. Neoliberal economists applaud this as “equilibrium,” as if it is part of economic nature and “free markets” rather than bare-knuckle diplomacy wielded with increasing aggressiveness by U.S. officials. The mass media chime in, pretending that recycling the dollar glut to finance U.S. military spending is “showing their faith in U.S. economic strength” by sending “their” dollars here to “invest.” It is as if a choice is involved, not financial and diplomatic compulsion to choose merely between “Yes” (from China, reluctantly), “Yes, please” (from Japan and the European Union) and “Yes, thank you” (Britain, Georgia and Australia).

It is not “foreign faith in the U.S. economy” that leads foreigners to “put their money here.” That’s a silly cartoon of a more sinister dynamic. The “foreigners” in question are not consumers buying U.S. exports, nor are they private-sector “investors” buying U.S. stocks and bonds. The largest and most important foreign entities putting “their money” here are central banks, and it is not “their money” at all. They are sending back the dollars that foreign exporters and other recipients turn over to their central banks for domestic currency.

When the U.S. payments deficit pumps dollars into foreign economies, these banks are being given little option except to buy U.S. Treasury bills and bonds – which the Treasury spends on financing an enormous, hostile military build-up to encircle the major dollar-recyclers – China, Japan and Arab OPEC oil producers. Yet these governments are forced to recycle dollar inflows in a way that funds U.S. military policies in which they have no say in formulating, and which threaten them more and more belligerently. That is why China and Russia took the lead in forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a few years ago.

Here in Europe there is a clear awareness that the U.S. payments deficit is much larger than just the trade deficit. One need merely look at Table 5 of the U.S. balance-of-payments data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and published by the Dept. of Commerce in its Survey of Current Business to see that the deficit does not stem merely from consumers buying more imports than the United States exports as the financial sector de-industrializes its economy. U.S. imports are now plunging as the economy shrinks and consumers are now finding themselves obliged to pay down the debts they have taken on.

Congress has told foreign investors in the largest dollar holder, China, not to buy anything except perhaps used-car dealerships and maybe more packaged mortgages and Fannie Mae stock – the equivalent of Japanese investors being steered into spending $1 billion for Rockefeller Center, on which they subsequently took a 100 per cent loss, and Saudi investment in Citigroup. That’s the kind of “international equilibrium” that U.S. officials love to see. “CNOOK go home” is the motto when it comes to serious attempts by foreign governments and their sovereign wealth funds (central bank departments trying to figure out what to do with their dollar glut) to make direct investments in American industry.

So we are left with the extent to which the U.S. payments deficit stems from military spending. The problem is not only the war in Iraq, now being extended to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the expensive build-up of U.S. military bases in Asian, European, post-Soviet and Third World countries. The Obama administration has promised to make the actual amount of this military spending more transparent. That presumably means publishing a revised set of balance of payments figures as well as domestic federal budget statistics.

The military overhead is much like a debt overhead, extracting revenue from the economy. In this case it is to pay the military-industrial complex, not merely Wall Street banks and other financial institutions. The domestic federal budget deficit does not stem only from “priming the pump” to give away enormous sums to create a new financial oligarchy. It contains an enormous and rapidly growing military component.

So Europeans and Asians see U.S. companies pumping more and more dollars into their economies. Not just to buy their exports in excess of providing them with goods and services in return; not just to buy their companies and “commanding heights” of privatized public enterprises without giving them reciprocal rights to buy important U.S. companies (remember the U.S. turn-down of China’s attempt to buy into the U.S. oil distribution business); not just to buy foreign stocks, bonds and real estate. The U.S. media somehow neglect to mention that the U.S. government is spending hundreds of billions of dollars abroad – not only in the Near East for direct combat, but to build enormous military bases to encircle the rest of the world, to install radar systems, guided missile systems and other forms of military coercion, including the “color revolutions” that have been funded – and are still being funded – all around the former Soviet Union.

Pallets of shrink-wrapped $100 bills adding up to tens of millions of the dollars at a time have become familiar “visuals” on some TV broadcasts, but the link is not made with U.S. military and diplomatic spending and foreign central-bank dollar holdings, which are reported simply as “wonderful faith in the U.S. economic recovery” and presumably the “monetary magic” being worked by Wall Street’s Tim Geithner at Treasury and Helicopter Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve.

Here’s the problem: The Coca Cola company recently tried to buy China’s largest fruit-juice producer and distributor. China already holds nearly $2 trillion in U.S. securities – way more than it needs or can use, inasmuch as the United States government refuses to let it buy meaningful U.S. companies. If the U.S. buyout would have been permitted to go through, this would have confronted China with a dilemma: Choice #1 would be to let the sale go through and accept payment in dollars, reinvesting them in what the U.S. Treasury tells it to do – U.S. Treasury bonds yielding about 1 per cent. China would take a capital loss on these when U.S. interest rates rise or when the dollar declines as the United States alone is pursuing expansionary Keynesian policies in an attempt to enable the U.S. economy to carry its debt overhead.

Choice #2 is not to recycle the dollar inflows. This would lead the renminbi to rise against the dollar, thereby eroding China’s export competitiveness in world markets. So China chose a third way, which brought U.S. protests. It turned the sale of its tangible company for merely “paper” U.S. dollars – which went with the “choice” to fund further U.S. military encirclement of the Shanghai Cooperative Agreement. The only people who seem not to be drawing this connection are the American mass media, and hence public. I can assure you from personal experience, it is being drawn here in Europe. (Here’s a good diplomatic question to discuss: Which will be the first European country besides Russia to join the S.C.O.?)

Academic textbooks have nothing to say about how “equilibrium” in foreign capital movements – speculative as well as for direct investment – is infinite as far as the U.S. economy is concerned. The U.S. economy can create dollars freely, now that they no longer are convertible into gold or even into purchases of U.S. companies, inasmuch as America remains the world’s most protected economy. It alone is permitted to protect its agriculture by import quotas, having “grandfathered” these into world trade rules half a century ago. Congress refuses to let “sovereign wealth” funds invest in important U.S. sectors.

So we are confronted with the fact that the U.S. Treasury prefers foreign central banks to keep on funding its domestic budget deficit, which means financing the cost of America’s war in the Near East and encirclement of foreign countries with rings of military bases. The more “capital outflows” U.S. investors spend to buy up foreign economies –the most profitable sectors, where the new U.S. owners can extract the highest monopoly rents – the more funds end up in foreign central banks to support America’s global military build-up. No textbook on political theory or international relations has suggested axioms to explain how nations act in a way so adverse to their own political, military and economic interests. Yet this is just what has been happening for the past generation.

So the ultimate question turns out to be what countries can do to counter this financial attack. A Basque labor union asked me whether I thought that controlling speculative capital movements would ensure that the financial system would act in the public interest. Or is outright nationalization necessary to better develop the real economy?

It is not simply a problem of “regulation” or “control of speculative capital movements.” The question is how nations can act as real nations, in their own interest rather than being roped into serving whatever the American government decides is in America’s interest.

Any country trying to do what the United States has done for the past 150 years is accused of being “socialist” – and this from the most anti-socialist economy in the world, except when it calls bailouts for its banks “socialism for the rich,” a.k.a. financial oligarchy. This rhetorical inflation almost leaves no alternative but outright nationalization of credit as a basic public utility.

Of course, the word “nationalization” has become a synonym for bailing out the largest and most reckless banks from their bad loans, and bailing out hedge funds and non-bank counterparties for losses on “casino capitalism,” gambling on derivatives that AIG and other insurers or players on the losing side of these gambles are unable to pay. Bailout in this form is not nationalization in the traditional sense of the term – bringing credit creation and other basic financial functions back into the public domain. It is the opposite. It prints new government bonds to turn over – along with self-regulatory power – to the financial sector, blocking the citizenry from taking back these functions.

Framing the issue as a choice between democracy and oligarchy turns the question into one of who will control the government doing the regulation and “nationalizing.” If it is done by a government whose central bank and major congressional committees dealing with finance are run by Wall Street, this will not help steer credit into productive uses. It will merely continue the Greenspan-Paulson-Geithner era of more and larger free lunches for their financial constituencies.

The financial oligarchy’s idea of “regulation” is to make sure that deregulators are installed in the key positions and given only a minimal skeleton staff and little funding. Despite Alan Greenspan’s announcement that he has come to see the light and realizes that self-regulation doesn’t work, the Treasury is still run by a Wall Street official and the Fed is run by a lobbyist for Wall Street. To lobbyists the real concern isn’t ideology as such – it’s naked self-interest for their clients. They may seek out well-meaning fools, especially prestigious figures from academia. But these are only front men, headed as they are by the followers of Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago. Such individuals are put in place as “gate-keepers” of the major academic journals to keep out ideas that do not well serve the financial lobbyists.

This pretence for excluding government from meaningful regulation is that finance is so technical that only someone from the financial “industry” is capable of regulating it. To add insult to injury, the additional counter-intuitive claim is made that a hallmark of democracy is to make the central bank “independent” of elected government. In reality, of course, that is just the opposite of democracy. Finance is the crux of the economic system. If it is not regulated democratically in the public interest, then it is “free” to be captured by special interests. So this becomes the oligarchic definition of “market freedom.”

The danger is that governments will let the financial sector determine how “regulation” will be applied. Special interests seek to make money from the economy, and the financial sector does this in an extractive way. That is its marketing plan. Finance today is acting in a way that de-industrializes economies, not builds them up. The “plan” is austerity for labor, industry and all sectors outside of finance, as in the IMF programs imposed on hapless Third World debtor countries. The experience of Iceland, Latvia and other “financialized” economies should be examined as object lessons, if only because they top the World Bank’s ranking of countries in terms of the “ease of doing business.”

The only meaningful regulation can come from outside the financial sector. Otherwise, countries will suffer what the Japanese call “descent from heaven”: regulators are selected from the ranks of bankers and their “useful idiots.” Upon retiring from government they return to the financial sector to receive lucrative jobs, “speaking engagements” and kindred paybacks. Knowing this, they regulate in favor of financial special interests, not that of the public at large.

The problem of speculative capital movements goes beyond drawing up a set of specific regulations. It concerns the scope of national government power. The International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement prevent countries from restoring the “dual exchange rate” systems that many retained down through the 1950s and even into the ‘60s. It was widespread practice for countries to have one exchange rate for goods and services (sometimes various exchange rates for different import and export categories) and another for “capital movements.” Under American pressure, the IMF enforced the pretence that there is an “equilibrium” rate that just happens to be the same for goods and services as it is for capital movements. Governments that did not buy into this ideology were excluded from membership in the IMF and World Bank – or were overthrown.

The implication today is that the only way a nation can block capital movements is to withdraw from the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For the first time since the 1950s this looks like a real possibility, thanks to worldwide awareness of how the U.S. economy is glutting the global economy with surplus “paper” dollars – and U.S. intransigence at stopping its free ride. From the U.S. vantage point, this is nothing less than an attempt to curtail its international military program.

Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist. A Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) He can be at: mh@michael-hudson.com

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